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I.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does Yelp, an internet company that sells advertising to

businesses and also permits third parties to post anonymous, unvetted and
unedited reviews of those businesses, have a First Amendment right to post,
in perpetuity, other people’s statements that have been judicially
determined to be defamatory? (No.)
2.

Did the Court of Appeal err in adhering to this Court’s

precedent and holding that Yelp was not deprived of due process by the
trial court’s issuance of a removal order requiring Yelp to take down three
postings that had been judicially determined to be defamatory? (No.)
3.

Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the

Communications Decency Act, 47 United States Code section 230 et seq.,
does not prevent the court from enforcing a valid order against a named
individual through Yelp? (No.)
II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Despite Yelp’s overblown rhetoric, the issue before the Court is an

exceedingly narrow one: May Yelp, an internet company that sells
advertising to businesses and also allows third parties to post anonymous,
unvetted and unedited reviews of those businesses, republish, in perpetuity,
three postings that have been judicially determined to be defamatory? No
reasonable reading of the law permits the answer to be yes.
Yelp invokes the First Amendment, the Due Process clause, and the
federal Communications Decency Act. None of these law allows Yelp to
ignore a court order preventing the republication of libel.
This case is not a First Amendment case involving merely critical
reviews. Indeed, below its surface arguments, Yelp (1) acknowledges that
the defamation judgment is against Bird, not Yelp; and (2) does not dispute
1

that it has no standing to challenge the underlying defamation judgment
against Bird. (OBM, 14).1 As this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court
have held repeatedly, defamatory speech has long been recognized to fall
outside the scope of First Amendment protections. (See Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 245-246; Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 776 [false statements have “no
constitutional value” because they “harm both the subject of the falsehood
and the readers of the statement”]; Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1147). Yelp has no First Amendment right to
distribute defamatory speech any more than the speaker has to create the
speech in the first instance. Thus, to the extent that Yelp believes that it
has a right to perpetuate defamation because it has a separate First
Amendment right to distribute speech, it is entirely mistaken. There is no
constitutional purpose in protecting the publication of proven lies.
Yelp admits that its due process arguments are largely based on the
false premise that it has a First Amendment right to post proven libel.
(OBM, 19). Without the protective cover of the First Amendment, Yelp’s
due process argument withers. Yelp must, and cannot, identify any other
protected interest that would trigger due process considerations. (Bd. of
Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 570). Further, Yelp cannot escape
the well-established rule that an injunction may run to classes of persons
through whom the enjoined party may act. (People ex rel. Gwinn v.
Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766-767).
1

References to Yelp’s Opening Brief on the Merits are designated “OBM.”
References to the Court of Appeal’s opinion are designated “Op.”
References to Appellate Record are designated by “AA” followed by the
volume number, tab number, and page numbers, e.g. AA.V1.T3.1-3.
2

Yelp’s brief is also marred by a fundamental and irreconcilable
inconsistency. For purposes of its constitutional arguments Yelp insists
that it is a publisher, but for purposes of its argument that the
Communications Decency Act shields it from liability, it distances itself
from the speech at issue, emphasizing that it played no role in the creation
of the defamatory speech. The CDA was never intended to permit
freewheeling defamation on the internet. Simply put, the CDA does not
grant Yelp license to republish judicially determined libel in perpetuity.
Imagine an advertisement on the New York Times website falsely
proclaiming that a person is a rapist or a serial killer. Under Yelp’s
reasoning, the website can never be compelled to remove the
advertisement, even if the statements contained therein are proven in a
court of law to be false. Yelp ascribes to Hassell a nefarious plan to
undermine free speech and flout the law when in fact its own conduct must
be scrutinized. Hassell simply followed the law. Indeed, she tried to
resolve the matter out of court with both Bird and Yelp. Only after being
met with outright refusal from both did she seek relief to which she is
lawfully entitled.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE.2
A.

Yelp Is A Business That Permits Third Parties to Post
Anonymous, Unvetted Comments Online.

Yelp hosts an online directory of businesses that permits users to
post comments and rank businesses on a scale of one to five stars. Yelp
2

The relevant background of the case is set forth accurately and in detail
in the Court of Appeal’s opinion. (Op., 2-10). As Yelp did not seek
rehearing, this Court should accept the Court of Appeal’s statement of the
issues and facts, which is more complete and balanced than the statement
Yelp offers. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2)).
3

sells paid advertising to businesses that runs alongside the user comments.
Businesses cannot opt out of being listed on Yelp. (See Levitt v. Yelp! Inc.
(9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3d 1123, 1126).3
Yelp’s online directory is akin to a neighborhood bulletin board:
Yelp permits third parties to post anonymous, unvetted, and unedited
comments to the directory. Comments can be removed by the reviewer.
In addition, Yelp states that it may remove reviews for violating its Terms
of Service or Content Guidelines such as “writing a fake or defamatory
review.” (AA.V3.T27.00748; see also AA.V3.T27.00757).4 In addition,
Yelp uses an undisclosed algorithm to highlight or hide certain reviews.
(AA.V3.T33.00838; see Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1126).
B.

Bird Posts Defamatory Comments On Yelp.

Plaintiffs and Respondents Hassell Law Group and its principal,
attorney Dawn Hassell (collectively “Hassell” or “Plaintiffs”), represented
Defendant Ava Bird in a personal injury case for less than a month in the
summer of 2012. During that time, Hassell had at least two
communications with Allstate Insurance Company about Bird’s injury
claim and notified Bird about those communications via e-mail. Hassell
also had dozens of direct communications with Bird by e-mail and phone
and at least one in-person meeting.
Bird, however, was largely nonresponsive to these communications.
She failed to return promptly a signed insurance authorization, and did not
respond to repeated attempts to set up a phone conference to discuss her
3

“How do I add a business to Yelp?”, Yelp, available at https://www.yelpsupport.com/article/How-do-I-add-a-business-to-Yelp?l=en_US (last
visited Jan. 23, 2017).
4
Yelp’s Terms of Service, available at https://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos
(last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
4

case. (AA.V1.T6.00054-55, 74-86; AA.V1.T7.00144-145, 168-183).
After these communication difficulties, Hassell withdrew from
representation on September 13, 2012. At the time, Bird had 21 months
before the expiration of the statute of limitations on her personal injury
claim, and had not lost any rights or claims relating to her injury.
(AA.V1.T6.00055).
In response, Ava Bird wrote a defamatory post on Yelp that
seriously and measurably harmed Hassell’s business. (AA.V1.T.6.A00055
[the “January Post”]). The post, under the moniker “Birdzeye B.,” gave
Plaintiff one star of an available five stars, and contained malicious and
false statements such as “dawn hassell made a bad situation much worse for
me,” “the hassell group didn’t speak to the insurance company either,” and
that Hassell indicated “the insurance company was too much for her to
handle.” (AA.V1.T1. 00018).
Hassell attempted to contact Bird by phone to discuss the posting,
but she failed to return the call, so the firm sent her an email “requesting
she remove the factual inaccuracies and defamatory remarks from her
Yelp.com written statement.” (AA.V1.T6.00056, 94). Bird responded by
email the next day, stating, among other things, that “you deserve the
review I have given you on yelp,” and “you will have to accept the
permanent” review. (AA.V1.T6.00056, 95). Even though in her Yelp post,
Bird had stated that Hassell had not communicated with her or with the
insurance company, Bird’s email to Hassell admitted that there were
multiple email communications with Hassell and that Hassell had contacted
the insurance company multiple times. (AA.V1.T6.00095-98). Bird also
refused to remove the post stating that she posted it to “be a lesson to you,”
threatened to have a friend post another bad review, and stated that she
5

“giggled at the thought” of a defamation suit and would “be happy to
present the evidence to the judge…” She concluded the email “FUCK
YOU DAWN HASSELL, A CALLOUS, HEARTLESS, NO-GOOD
ATTORNEY.” (Id.). Hassell did not respond.
Days later, Bird posted another review under the moniker “J.D.”
(AA.V1.T6.57, 99-101[the “February Post”]). Hassell understood that
Bird was “J.D.” because Hassell never represented a client with the initials
J.D., and because the February Post was published shortly after the January
Post and used similar language. (Id.). In addition, the posting was from
Alameda, where Bird was served, and it was a first-time posting for that
user. (Id.).
C.

After Bird Refuses To Remove The Review, And Writes A
Second One, Hassell Institutes An Action Against Bird
For Defamation And Asks Yelp To Remove The Reviews.

Because the defamatory postings had palpably harmed the law firm’s
business and Bird refused to remove them, Hassell filed suit against Bird on
April 10, 2013. (AA.V1.T1.00001-21). The Complaint alleged four
causes of action for damages relating to the “Birdzeye B.” and “J.D.” posts,
(id. at 6-13), and a fifth cause of action for injunctive relief based on the
continued irreparable harm to their business resulting from Bird’s
defamatory posts. (Id. at 13). The prayer sought to enjoin Bird from
continuing to defame Hassell, and requiring her to remove every
defamatory review, from Yelp.com and elsewhere. (Id.). The Complaint
attached the Yelp postings at issue. (AA.V1.T1.00015-20).
Over the next week, after Hassell made many attempts to serve Bird
personally, they finally effected substitute service on April 17, 2013.
(AA.V1.T3.00024-27). Just over a week later, on April 29, 2013, Bird
“updated” her original post with a new post, stating that “Dawn Hassell has
6

filed a lawsuit against me over this review.” “She has tried to threaten,
bully, intimidate, harrass [sic] me into removing the review!”
(AA.V1.T6.00057, 102-105[the “April Post”]).
Not long after Bird was served, Yelp received actual notice of the
litigation. On May 13, 2013, only one month after the Complaint was
filed, Hassell’s attorney sent Yelp’s General Counsel (and its support page)
a letter enclosing the file-stamped Complaint and explaining that Hassell
expected Yelp “will cause these two utterly false and unprivileged reviews
to be removed as soon as possible.” (AA.V3.T21.00601-601, 00617-634).
The Complaint and letter plainly raised both the demand and practical
reality that if Ms. Bird refused to take down the reviews, some affirmative
conduct by Yelp would be the only way to stop the ongoing defamation.
(Id.; see also AA.V3.T33.00837:13-15).
D.

The Trial Court Enters A Default And Conducts An
Evidentiary Hearing.

Neither Bird nor Yelp appeared in the action. On June 20, 2013,
Hassell filed a Request for Entry of Default, and served the same upon
Bird. (AA.V1.T3, T5.00031). On June 28, 2013, Plaintiffs received a
letter from the Bar Association of San Francisco stating that Bird had
expressed interest in mediating the dispute. Hassell conveyed an offer to
Bird through the mediator to dismiss the lawsuit in exchange for Bird’s
removal of her defamatory reviews on Yelp or her agreement not to publish
any further defamatory reviews. Bird never responded to the proposal, and
mediation efforts quickly ceased. (AA.V1.T5.00031-32).
Plaintiffs’ requested default was entered on July 11, 2013.
(AA.V1.T3.00023). Hassell then moved for a default judgment. A
hearing on the application for default judgment and request for injunctive
7

relief was set for January 14, 2014. (AA.V1.T4.00028-29).
The trial court reviewed and heard extensive evidence and argument
in support of Hassell’s claims, ranging from Bird’s email admitting she had
posted the review to teach Ms. Hassell “a lesson,” (AA.V1.T6.00096), to
Plaintiffs’ efforts to serve Bird (AA.V1.T3.00024-26, AA.V1.T6.00124140), to Bird’s affirmative refusal to mediate the lawsuit, (AA.V1.T5.3132), to detailed explanations why each of the reviews was demonstrably
false, (AA.V1.T6-7), as well as thorough briefing on the merits of each
claim, (AA.V1.T5.00036-51). Plaintiffs’ briefing explained that if Bird
refused to comply with the requested injunction, the only way to remove
the posts would be a court order requiring Yelp to do so. (AA.V1.T5.5051). Hassell also produced substantial documentation proving that Bird’s
statements were untrue.
E.

The Trial Court Enters A Money Judgment And
Injunction, Enforceable Through Yelp, Against Bird.

After the evidentiary hearing, the Court granted most of the relief
Hassell sought.

(AA.V1.T8.00211; AA.V1.T9.00212-216). It ordered

$557,918.85 in damages against Bird, denied the request for punitive
damages, and granted injunctive relief. (Id.). The Judgment and Order
provided:
…Defendant AVA BIRD is ordered to remove each and every
defamatory review published or caused to be published by her about
plaintiffs HASSELL LAW GROUP and DAWN HASSELL from
Yelp.com and from anywhere else they appear on the internet within
5 business day of the date of the court’s order.
Defendant AVA BIRD, her agents, officers, employees or
representatives, or anyone acting on her behalf, are further enjoined
8

from publishing or causing to be published any written reviews,
commentary, or descriptions of DAWN HASSELL or the HASSELL
LAW GROUP on Yelp.com or any other internet location or
website.
Yelp.com is ordered to remove all reviews posted by AVA
BIRD under user names “Birdzeye B.” and “J.D.” attached hereto as
Exhibit A and any subsequent comments of these reviewers within 7
business days of the date of the court’s order.
(AA.V1.T9.00213). Exhibit A attached the January Post, the February
Post and the April Post. (Id. at 00212-215).
F.

Hassell Give Yelp Notice, And Yelp Refuses To Intervene
And Refuses To Remove The Adjudicated Defamatory
Statements.

Plaintiffs hand-delivered the Judgment and Order, with a letter
requesting that Yelp remove the posts, on January 15, 2014.
(AA.V3.T27.00704-718; AA.V3.T28.00798-799). Plaintiffs then
personally served Yelp’s agent for service of process with the Order on
January 29, 2014, along with a letter again requesting that Yelp remove the
three posts. (AA.V3.T27.00720-730).
Yelp ignored the judgment and flatly refused to remove the libelous
posts. Yelp’s Senior Director of Litigation Aaron Schur responded by
letter dated February 3, 2014, claiming that Yelp was not subject to the
injunction, that the default was improper, and that Plaintiffs had not
adequately proved that Bird posted the reviews or that the reviews were
defamatory. (AA.V3.T27.00732-734). He wrote:
[T]he judgment and order are rife with deficiencies and Yelp sees no
reason at this time to remove the reviews at issue. Of course, Yelp
has no desire to display defamatory content on its site, but the
9

defamation must be proven. A default judgment through a bench
trial in a lawsuit in which it does not appear the defendant was ever
served is an insufficient basis for Yelp to consider the review of
Birdzeye B. to be defamatory – much less the review of J.D. Yelp
would revisit its decision if the facts change, for example, if it
receives evidence that the defendant is actually served, fails to
defend herself, and is responsible for both reviews.
(AA.V3.T27.00734). In other words, Yelp chose to credit its own
disingenuous5 analysis over the court’s judgment after a default prove-up
hearing.
Four months later, Yelp moved to vacate the entire judgment.
(AA.V1.T11.00225). After considering briefing and hearing extensive
argument (AA.V3.T33.829-854), the trial court denied the motion.
(AA.V3.T30.808-810). The trial court observed that “injunctions can be
applied to non-parties,” citing a line of cases allowing an injunction to run
against those acting “in concert with or in support of” the enjoined party.
(AA.V3.T30.00809, quoting Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899,
906). The court also noted evidence demonstrating that Yelp aided and
abetted Bird in maintaining the false statements. (Id.).
Yelp appealed the ruling.
G.

The Court of Appeal Affirms The Trial Court’s Removal
Order.

The Court of Appeal largely upheld the trial court’s decision,
soundly rejecting the arguments Yelp reiterates here.
5

Yelp, of course, has the records it faults Plaintiffs for not subpoenaing
(AA.V1.T12.00228) and can check who posted the comments.
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First, in resolving standing issues (which Yelp does not contest, see
OBM, 14), the court noted that Yelp’s appeal impermissibly attempted to
mount a collateral attack on the underlying defamation judgment. “Yelp’s
claimed interest in maintaining [its] Website as it deems appropriate does
not include the right to second-guess a final court judgment which
establishes that statements by a third party are defamatory and thus
unprotected by the First Amendment.” (Op., 11).
Second, the Court of Appeal rejected Yelp’s argument that the
removal order was barred by due process. The court embraced the “settled
principles” and “common practice” of permitting an injunction, such as the
removal order at issue here, to run to a non-party. (Op., 19). The court
also rejected Yelp’s contention that it had a First Amendment right to
distribute third-party speech that could not be denied without notice and a
hearing, holding that Yelp did not have a First Amendment right to
distribute speech that had specifically “been found to be defamatory in a
judicial proceeding.” (Op., 23). Yelp failed, as it does here, to offer any
authority “which confers a constitutional right to a prior hearing before a
distributor can be ordered to comply with an injunction that precludes republication of specific third party speech that has already been adjudged to
be unprotected and tortious.” (Id.). Further, the court noted that the
United States Supreme Court has “never held, or even implied, that there is
an absolute First or Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior adversary
hearing” whenever any alleged unprotected materials is seized or impacted.
(Op., 23 quoting Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 488).
Third, the Court of Appeal rejected Yelp’s overbroad prior restraint
argument. The appellate court, held, as this Court did in Balboa Island, 40
Cal.4th 1141, that “an injunction issued following a trial that determined
11

that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, that does no more than prohibit the
defendant from repeating the defamation, is not a prior restraint and does
not offend the First Amendment.” (Id. at 1148; Op., 24). The court did
trim the removal order to remove subsequent comments that Bird or anyone
else might post as an “overbroad prior restraint on speech.” (Op., 25).
Finally, the court found that any immunity from liability Yelp may
enjoy under the CDA was inapplicable to its status as a third-party in this
case. Looking to the plain language of the statute, the court reasoned that
“[t]he removal order does not violate section 230 because it does not
impose any liability on Yelp. In this defamation action, Hassell filed their
complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird,
not Yelp and was awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not
Yelp.” (Op., 28). Yelp did not cite any “authority that applies section
230 to restrict a court from directing an Internet service provider to comply
with a judgment which enjoins the originator of defamatory statements
posted on the service provider’s Web site.” (Id.). It noted that California
law both authorizes an injunction against statements adjudged to be
defamatory, and permits injunctions to run to a non-party through whom
the enjoined party may act, procedures which are not inconsistent with
section 230 “because they do not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a
speaker or as a publisher of third party speech.” (Op., 29). As a result,
the court found that the CDA, which acts as a shield from tort liability, did
not excuse Yelp from compliance with court orders. (Op., 31).
Yelp petitioned the Court for review. Bird’s libelous statements
remain online to this day.
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IV.

THE COURT OF APPEAL PROPERLY AFFIRMED A
NARROW ORDER REQUIRING YELP TO REMOVE
THREE POSTINGS THAT WERE JUDICIALLY
DETERMINED TO BE DEFAMATORY.
A.

This Case Does Not Involve A Challenge To The
Underlying Defamation Finding And Injunction Against
Bird.

In an effort to transform this case into a First Amendment case, Yelp
repeatedly refers to Bird’s statements as merely “critical,” and otherwise
seeks to have this Court question the validity of the trial court’s finding of
defamation. (See, e.g., OBM, 9, 16). This attempt to blur the lines
between protected and unprotected speech is a blatant misrepresentation of
the record and is beyond the scope of the issues properly before this Court
upon review.
The Court of Appeal found – a finding not challenged by Yelp in its
petition to this Court – that Yelp did not have standing to challenge the
judgment, and thus the underlying finding of defamation, against Bird.
(Op. 10-11 [“Yelp has endeavored to blur the distinction between the
judgment entered against Bird which awarded Hassell damages and
injunctive relief, and the removal order in the judgment which directs Yelp
to effectuate the injunction against Bird.”], 17-18 [“Yelp cannot bootstrap
its collateral attack of an allegedly void order into a substantive appeal of
the default judgment itself. The question whether the trial court should have
granted an injunction against Bird is outside the scope of this appeal.”]).
Yelp acknowledges this ruling, but Yelp’s refusal to honor it
permeates its brief.
B.

Yelp Does Not Have A First Amendment Right To Post
Defamatory Content.

Yelp’s insistence that its due process rights were violated largely
13

rests on its false contention that it has a First Amendment right to post
Bird’s defamatory statements. But it is axiomatic that there is no First
Amendment protection where, as here, the statements at issue are
statements that have been conclusively adjudged to be defamatory. (See
Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 743 [“[F]alse
statements are not immunized by the First Amendment.”]; Herbert v. Lando
(1979) 441 U.S. 153, 171 [“Spreading false information in and of itself
carries no First Amendment credentials.”]; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 771
[“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for
its own sake.”]; Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) 343 U.S. 250, 256 [“the
prevention and punishment” of libel has “never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem”]).
To avoid this correct conclusion here, Yelp makes two unpersuasive
arguments. First, it claims that it has independent First Amendment rights
as a publisher to post defamatory material. Second, it claims that the Court
of Appeal permitted the trial court to engage in a prior restraint. Neither
argument has merit.
1.

Yelp Offers No Authority Supporting Its Novel
Claim To A First Amendment Right To Publish
Libelous Statements.

Although it disavows any role in creating Bird’s defamatory
statements at issue, Yelp insists that it has a First Amendment right to post
those statements. This issue is without nuance. Yelp has no First
Amendment right to publish proven defamatory speech. Once this false
premise is stripped away, it is evident that Yelp cannot base its due process
claim on its free speech rights because, as to Bird’s libel – which is the only
14

speech at issue -- it has none. As the Court of Appeal found, and as
continues to be true now, “Yelp does not cite any authority which confers a
constitutional right to a prior hearing before a distributor can be ordered to
comply with an injunction that precludes republication of specific third
party speech that has already been adjudged to be unprotected and
tortious.” (Op., 23).
Yelp relies primarily on Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property
(1961) 367 U.S. 717. The Court of Appeal carefully and correctly
analyzed Marcus. (See Op., 21-23). There, the Supreme Court found
the procedure to be constitutionally inadequate because no judicial officer
had reviewed the allegedly obscene materials before seizure, and they were
seized at the discretion of individual police officers without standards to
follow and without a requirement that the court determine whether the
materials are actually obscene within any particular time. (367 U.S. at
731-732, 737).
Marcus is inapposite for three reasons. First, the distributors in
Marcus “personally engaged in protected speech activities by selling books,
magazines and newspapers,” while Yelp disavowed any role in Bird’s
speech and, more importantly, “the removal order does not treat Yelp as a
publisher of Bird’s speech, but rather as the administrator of the forum that
Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews.” (Op., 22).
Second, even if Yelp’s “operation of an interactive website is
construed as constitutionally protected speech by a distributor, Marcus does
not support Yelp’s broad notion that a distributor of third party speech has
an unqualified due process right to notice and a hearing before distribution
of that speech can be enjoined.” (Op., 23). As the Court of Appeal here
noted, a litany of problems led the Court in Marcus to conclude that
15

appellants’ due process rights were violated. (Id.). The court also noted
that the Supreme Court clarified in Heller – another case cited by Yelp that
does not aid it -- that “[t]his Court has never held, or even implied, that
there is an absolute First or Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior
adversary hearing applicable to all cases where allegedly obscene material
is seized. [Citations.]” (Op., 23, citing Heller, 413 U.S. at 488).
Third, and as the Court of Appeal here found, “crucially,” “the due
process problems explored in Marcus, supra, 367 U.S. 717, and its progeny
pertain to attempts to suppress speech that is only suspected of being
unlawful. Here, we address the very different situation in which specific
speech has already been found to be defamatory in a judicial proceeding.”
(Op., 23). Unlike Marcus, then, a court here actually reviewed the
material at issue in this case, and gave the original author of it an
opportunity to appear at a hearing, before entering its order. Yelp
attempts to gloss over this distinction, but it makes all the difference.
None of the other cases cited by Yelp rally to its aid. For example,
in Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 421 U.S. 809, the Supreme Court addressed a
challenge to a statute as constitutionally overbroad where it resulted in a
newspaper editor being convicted for publishing an advertisement that
provided information about abortion services. (Id. at 817-19). The Court
rejected the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that the speech at issue
was unprotected because it had commercial aspects. (Id.). However, in
so holding, the Court specifically distinguished other categories of speech,
“such as fighting words…or libel…or incitement…[that] have been held
unprotected, [as] no contention has been made that the particular speech
embraced in the advertisement in question is within any of these
categories.” (Id. at 819 [emphasis added]). Similarly, Yelp cites to Ark.
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Educ. Tv Comm'n v. Forbes (1998) 523 U.S. 666, 674 for the unremarkable
proposition that publishers may be entitled in certain contexts to assert First
Amendment rights to their programming. That case has no bearing on the
free speech rights of consumer review websites such as Yelp, to say
nothing of free speech rights as they relate to the republication of libel.
(See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 279-283
[knowingly false statements not entitled to constitutional protection, even in
heightened context of public interest]).6
Yelp offers no case, because indeed there is none, that grants Yelp a
constitutional right to a prior hearing before being ordered to remove third
party speech that has been judicially determined to be defamatory.
Instead, Yelp cites to a couple of cases to support its vague and
undeveloped assertion that as a website, Yelp is entitled to the same First
Amendment and due process protection as publishers and editors. Even if
this were true, Yelp cites no case that permits a publisher or an editor to

6

Yelp also dumps several inapposite cases into a footnote. Carroll v.
President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 180, holding
that ex parte orders against protected speech cannot issue where defending
parties had no opportunity to appear, does not apply to this context where
Bird’s libelous speech was adjudicated after notice and a hearing. Lee Art
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia (1968) 392 U.S. 636, 637, finding a due process
violation where alleged obscenity was seized based upon “conclusory
assertions” of a police officer “without any inquiry by the justice of the
peace into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions,” has no bearing on
the facts or issues in this case. (See also A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas (1964) 378 U.S. 205, 212-213 [same].) And Kash Enterprises, Inc.
v. Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, addressed a city ordinance that
permitted seizure of news racks violating location and size requirements.
Neither the reasoning nor the holding of any of these cases advances Yelp’s
position.
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republish an adjudicated defamatory statement in perpetuity.7 Yelp cannot
shoehorn this case into the line of cases finding constitutional concerns
where there is state action involving speech that was merely suspected of
being unlawful. That distinction is critical: Yelp’s conduct – insisting on
continuing to host adjudged defamatory content – has no constitutional
protection.
2.

Yelp’s Constant Refrain That A Prior Restraint
Exists Here Is Entirely Unsupported By The
Factual And Legal Record.

Sensing the weakness of its contention that it has a First Amendment
right to distribute proven defamatory speech, Yelp then pivots to claim that
the removal order constitutes a prior restraint. It does not. As this Court
has held, “once a court has found that a specific pattern of speech is
unlawful, an injunctive order prohibiting the repetition, perpetuation, or
continuation of that practice is not a prohibited ‘prior restraint’ of speech.
[Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121,
140). Yelp’s argument is yet another distortion of the record and the law.
As an initial matter, Yelp plays fast and loose with the term “prior
restraint.” In the first paragraph of its Summary of Argument (OBM, 2),
for example, Yelp uses the term three times, each time without clearly
articulating what it believes the prior restraint to be. To be clear, “[o]rders
which restrict or preclude a citizen from speaking in advance are known as
‘prior restraints.’” (Hurvitz v. Hoefflin (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1241).
To the extent that Yelp faults the lower courts for including in the

Yelp faults the Court of Appeal for labeling it as an “administrator of a
forum” rather than a publisher. Again, however, Yelp fails to
acknowledge that the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher and,
even if it did, no constitutional right exists to post libel.

7
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removal order any “subsequent comments” posted by Bird, the Court of
Appeal directed the trial court to excise that portion of the order. (See Op.,
25).8 Hassell have not appealed that part of the decision. That issue is,
therefore, not before this Court.
To the extent that Yelp attempts to argue that the portion of the trial
court’s order directed at Bird constitutes a prior restraint on speech, that
issue is also not before this Court. As the lower court found, Yelp is an
“aggrieved party” entitled to appeal the removal order issued against it. It
has no standing to argue separately that the judgment against Bird is
erroneous. (Op., 10-11).
As to Yelp’s poorly articulated argument that the removal order
otherwise acts as a prior restraint on speech, both the facts and wellestablished law bar that claim. As modified by the Court of Appeal, the
removal order before this Court directs Yelp “to remove all reviews posted
by AVA BIRD under user names “Birdzeye B.” and “J.D.” attached hereto
as Exhibit A and any subsequent comments of these reviewers within 7
business days of the date of the court’s order.” (AA.V1.T9.000212-215).
Yelp admits that the removal order has been stripped of any obligation to
“bar publication of any comments by [Bird] that might be posted in the

8

It is possible that the “subsequent comments” language in the trial court’s
removal order was not directed at future speech at all. The evidence
demonstrated that after the complaint was filed, Bird posted an “update”
below her initial defamatory post, stating that Hassell “has tried to threaten,
bully, intimidate, harrass [sic] me into removing the review!” (See
AA.V1.T6.00057, 000102-105). That “update,” which may have been
characterized by the trial court as a “subsequent comment” was also
specifically found to be defamatory. (See AA.V1.T6.00057, 000102-105;
AA.V1.T9.00212-216). In any event, neither party contests that portion of
the Court of Appeal’s decision.
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future.” (OBM, 15). As a factual matter, then, the removal order does not
bar any future speech; it simply requires Yelp to remove three specific
posts – past speech -- that were judicially determined to be libel.
This Court’s decision in Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141 conclusively resolves the issue. There, the Court
stated:
[A]n injunction issued following a trial that determined that the
defendant defamed the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the
defendant from repeating the defamation, is not a prior restraint and
does not offend the First Amendment…. Prohibiting a person from
making a statement or publishing a writing before that statement is
spoken or the writing is published is far different from prohibiting a
defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that
has been determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful.
This distinction is hardly novel.
(Id. at 1148, 1150 [emphasis added]; see Op., 24). Yelp demands a
different result here, because Balboa Island involved a “contested trial”
rather than a “default judgment…that did not evaluate any of the individual
statements to determine if they are false, defamatory, and unprivileged.”
(OBM, 32). But this argument simply shows Yelp’s true grievance. Yelp
is not contesting what was a correct application of the law by the Court of
Appeal; instead it wants to challenge the underlying defamation.9 As the
lower court properly found, Yelp, which has repeatedly disavowed any
9

Yelp’s response to Hassell when they asked that the posts be removed
proves the point: Yelp’s General Counsel acknowledged that it would
remove defamatory statements, but claimed that the defamation here was
not “proven” because it was a bench trial and a default judgment.
(AA.V3.T27.00734).
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involvement in the creation of Bird’s defamatory statements, has no
standing to challenge the finding of defamation. (Op., 25). Stripped of
that argument, Yelp has no argument to resist the this Court’s holding in
Balboa Island, which plainly did not turn on the fact that it was a
“contested trial,” as opposed to a default judgment. (40 Cal.4th at 1156
[“Once specific expressional acts are properly determined to be unprotected
by the First Amendment, there can be no objection to their subsequent
suppression or prosecution.”]). Furthermore, the trial court here did not
merely rubber stamp Hassell’s allegations of defamation, but heard
extensive evidence in support of her claims.
The other cases offered by Yelp simply underscore the lack of any
prior restraint at play here. Several of these cases contain prohibitions on
future speech. (See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart (1976) 427 U.S. 539; Evans
v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1169; Assn. for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. Los Angeles Times Comm’n LLC (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 808.)
In Wilson v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 659, in
permitting the republication of possibly false or misleading statements
involving public officials, this Court specifically distinguished cases – like
this one – holding that libel is not entitled to First Amendment protection,
from cases involving public official that are subject to a higher standard.
And the Hurvitz court rejected arguments in favor of an order restraining
speech on the basis of medical privilege and privacy. (84 Cal.App. 4th at
1245-47.)
Yelp has not been compelled to act, in any way, with respect any
future speech. There is no prior restraint.
C.

Yelp Was Not Deprived Of Due Process.

The thrust of Yelp’s constitutional due process argument is that it
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was deprived of an opportunity to defend itself because it was not named as
a defendant in this action. “The United States Supreme Court faced and
explicitly rejected an almost identical due process contention over [] a
century ago.” (Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 905, citing In re Lennon (1897) 166 U.S.
548). As in Ross and Lennon, Yelp’s due process arguments must fail.
Yelp does not assert any protected rights that were affected by the
purported due process violation, and the removal order was entirely
consistent with well-established law.
1.

Yelp Has No Protected Interest Here Guaranteed
By The Due Process Clause, And It Received Actual
Notice In Any Event.

“[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
infinite.” (Roth, 408 U.S. at 570). Thus, “[a]lthough the amount and
quality of process… recognized as ‘due’ under the Clause has changed
considerably since the founding, it remains the case that no process is due if
one is not deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property.’” (Kerry v. Din (2015)
135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132 [emphasis in original] [internal citations omitted]).
Because Yelp’s due process is not based on its own protected interest, its
constitutional argument is fundamentally flawed.
The sorts of interests protected by the due process clause are
classified as either “liberty” or “property” interests. (See Roth, 408 U.S.
at 571-572). In order for a “liberty” to be protected, there must be both “a
careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest, as well as a
demonstration that the interest is objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it was sacrificed.” (Din, 135
S.Ct. at 2134, quoting Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, 72022

721; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-575 [right to continued state
employment not protected liberty]). The due process clause’s “protection
of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has
already acquired in specific benefits.” (Roth, 408 U.S. at 576). A
protected property interest must be based on “more than abstract need or
desire;” it must be based on “legitimate claim of entitlement.” (Id. at
577).
Courts are traditionally skeptical of finding either liberty or property
interests in the context of third party claims to due process. There is, after
all, a “simple distinction between government action that directly affects a
citizen’s legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action
that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or
incidentally.” (O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr. (1980) 447 U.S.
773, 788). In O’Bannon, a state agency sought to revoke a nursing
home’s operating authority. Approximately 180 of the home’s elderly
residents argued that they had due process rights to a hearing before the
revocation. While conceding the obvious “adverse impact” the
decertification would have on some residents, the Court reasoned that the
impact was “indirect” and “incidental” to the real action (the
decertification), and therefore “does not amount to a deprivation of any
interest in life, liberty, or property.” (Id. at 787).
In its constitutional challenge, Yelp does not recognize any of these
fundamental concepts to due process, and instead relies upon nebulous
assertions that it has some right to be heard on the Bird injunction. This
argument is first based on a repeated assertion that the required “interest” is
found in its “separate First Amendment right to distribute the speech of
others.” (OBM, 19). However, as described in detail above, Yelp has no
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First Amendment right to “distribute” defamatory remarks made by other
people.
Yelp also attempts to carve a protected interest from its desire “to
maintain the integrity of its website, for the benefit of its users.” (OBM,
17 n. 6). In Yelp’s view, if it “removed every review a business owner
argued was false or even defamatory, it would have few critical reviews on
its website.” (OBM, 17 n. 6). Again, Yelp cites no authority to support
its bald proposition that its website’s integrity rises to the level of becoming
a constitutionally protected interest. But just assuming arguendo that it
does have such protection, that interest is not remotely implicated in this
case. This case is not about merely critical reviews, or “argued”
defamation. Hassell sued Bird, and obtained a judgment based on
substantial evidence about the defamation, including email admissions by
Bird. Simply put, as the Court of Appeal stated, “Yelp's claimed interest
in maintaining its Web site as it deems appropriate does not include the
right to second-guess a final court judgment that establishes that statements
by a third party are defamatory.” (Op., 11).
Even if the injunction affected a recognized interest of Yelp’s –
which it does not – that effect is more akin to the “indirect” or “incidental”
impact that did not merit its own set of due process protections in
O’Bannon. Just as the real issue in O’Bannon was the certification matter
between the State and the nursing home (not the patients), the real issue in
this case is the defamation claim between Hassell and Bird (not Yelp).
And there is certainly no stronger link between the Bird judgment and Yelp
than between the O’Bannon decertification and the nursing home evictees.
This parallel, combined with Yelp’s dubious interest in Bird’s defamation,
highlights important distinctions between this case and the cases cited by
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Yelp to establish its due process framework, which largely involve cases
where a party’s recognized interests were directly at stake. (See e.g.,
Richards v. Jefferson County (1996) 517 U.S. 793, 794 [pecuniary interest
in tax liabilities]; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 272-74
[termination of drug treatment resources received as alternative to criminal
sentencing]; Fazzi v. Peters (1968) 68 Cal.2d 590 [money judgment against
an individual]; Estate of Buchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559
[removal of executor of probate estate]).10
Furthermore, Yelp’s due process argument fails on the facts of this
case because it is also well established that “[a]ctual notice satisfies due
process.” (Benson v. Cal. Coastal Com. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 348, 353,
citing In re Pence (7th Cir. 1990) 905 F.2d 1107, 1109; see also United
States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa (2010) 559 U.S. 260, 272 [“United
received actual notice… [t]his more than satisfied United’s due process
rights.”]; Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison Cty. (2d Cir. 2011) 665 F.3d
408, 429 [same]). Yelp has been provided extensive notice of the
developments in this case, and the relief sought, throughout litigation.
Most notably, Yelp had notice of this lawsuit and the requested injunctive
relief soon after it was filed, and specifically chose not to intervene. (See
10

Yelp cites two other cases in this string that are either unhelpful to its
position, or entirely unrelated to the matter at hand. In Blonder-Tongue
Labs v. University of Illinois Found. (1971) 402 U.S. 313, 350, the
Supreme Court allowed an estoppel defense that essentially blocked patent
plaintiffs from filing subsequent lawsuits against different defendants after
a court had already ruled the patent invalid. Also, the case of Chase
National Bank v. City of Norwalk, Ohio (1934) 291 U.S. 431, 440-441, is
not about due process, but instead stands for the uncontroversial and
unrelated proposition that a mortgagee’s rights were unaffected by the
city’s ouster action against the mortgagor.
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AA.V3.T21.00601-601, 00617-634). Yelp’s disingenuous protest to this
Court that it was deprived of “notice” lacks any factual support from the
record.
In the end, without any constitutionally protected interest at stake,
Yelp’s due process rights could not have been undermined. Its argument
fails on those grounds alone.
2.

It Is Well Established That Injunctions Can Be
Enforced Against Non-Parties “With or Through”
Whom an Enjoined Party Acts.

Yelp recognizes that it is “common practice” for an injunction to
“run also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined party may act.”
(OBM, 22, quoting Kothari, 83 Cal.App.4th at 766-767). While admitting
the ubiquity and firm legal foundation for this practice, Yelp paradoxically
views the practice as a “narrow” one. This Court should reject this
meritless argument.
As the Court of Appeal noted, this deeply-rooted practice is not
nearly as limited as Yelp suggests. (See Op., 19). Instead, “this practice
is thoroughly settled and approved by the courts.” (Kothari, 83
Cal.App.4th at 766-767; see also Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 905-906 [“this practice
has always been upheld by the courts”]). Illustrating how firmly
established this principle is, it has been upheld by this Court as early as
1917, (see Berger v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1917) 175 Cal.
719,) and by the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1897, (see Lennon, 166
U.S. at 554). “[T]he the whole effect of this is simply to make the
injunction effectual against all through whom the enjoined party may act…
and there is a fair foundation for a conclusion that persons so co-operating
with the enjoined party are guilty of a disobedience of the injunction.”
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(Berger, 175 Cal. at 721). Simply put, the rule ensures that an enjoined
defendant does not “avoid the force of an injunction” by acting through
others. (Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 909).
Each of the cases cited by Yelp confirms this general rule. For
example, Yelp first cites to Regal Knitwear v. NLRB (1945) 324 U.S. 9 – a
case that actually supports Hassell. (OBM, 21). There, the U.S. Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that injunctions could apply to the conduct of
certain nonparties, including “those persons in active concert or
participation with [the defendants] who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.” (324 U.S. at 13-14, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(d)). As the court explained, consistent with the above authority, this
practice helps protect the court’s ability to administer justice by ensuring
compliance with its orders. (See id. at 14 [“defendants may not nullify a
decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors”]; see
also United States v. Paccione (2d Cir. 1992) 964 F.2d 1269, 1274-1275
[“A court may bind non-parties to the terms of an injunction or restraining
order to preserve its ability to render a judgment”]). Similarly, the Learned
Hand decision cited by Yelp “agree[s] a person who knowingly assists a
defendant in violating an injunction subjects himself to civil as well as
criminal proceedings for contempt. This is well settled law.” (Alemite
Mfg. Corp. v. Staff (2d Cir. 1930) 42 F.2d 832).11 This trend continues in
11

The end result in Alemite, that the appellant was not bound by the
injunction in that case, is beside the point for purposes of this case. The
Alemite appellant was acting on his own behalf, completely independent
from the enjoined defendants. (Alemite, 42 F.2d at 833.) Obviously,
while an injunction can run to parties through whom a defendant acts, no
injunction can prevent unnamed parties elsewhere in the universe from their
own independent actions that are unrelated to the enjoined defendant.
(See id. at 832 [injunctions are not against “the world at large.”].)
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the line of California cases discussed by Yelp. (See Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 905
[“it has been a common practice to make the injunction run also to classes
of persons through whom the enjoined party may act”]; Kothari, 83
Cal.App.4th at 766-767).
In fact, each of the cases cited by Yelp further confirms this general
rule that injunctions can run against nonparties “with or through whom the
enjoined party may act.” (Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 345, 353 [an injunction can run to the persons
“with or through whom the enjoined party may act” to prevent an enjoined
party from “nullify[ing] an injunctive decree by carrying out prohibited acts
with or through nonparties to the original proceeding”]; see also Ross, 19
Cal.3d at 905 [“it has been a common practice to make the injunction run
also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined party may act”];
People v. Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903 [“we conclude that a
nonparty to an injunction is subject to the contempt power of the court
when, with knowledge of the injunction, the nonparty violates its terms
with or for those who are restrained.”]).
The cases pointed out by Yelp where the scope of the injunction
exceeded the boundaries of this rule largely involved persons who were not
specifically named in the injunction, and who had, at best, only an
attenuated connection to the enjoined defendant. (See, e.g., Conrad, 55
Cal.App.4th at 903 [subsequent abortion protesters not subject to injunction
because “it must be [their] actual relationship to an enjoined party, and not
[just] their convictions about abortion, that make them contemners”];
Planned Parenthood, 107 Cal.App.4th at 353 [protestors may not be
subject to injunction where evidence was absent that they acted together
with or on behalf of enjoined parties]; Berger, 175 Cal. at 720 [subsequent
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protester who was “absolute stranger” to enjoined parties could not be
bound by injunction]; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 156 (injunction
could run to nonparties, but inclusion of those “in concert among
themselves” created “a baffling element of uncertainty as to the application
of the order to [unaffiliated] persons”]; see also Kothari, 83 Cal.App.4th at
770-771 [injunction against future owners of property improper because
specific cause of action did not allow injunctive relief to run in rem]).
Yelp also extrapolates too much from the Illinois case of Blockowicz
v. Williams (N.D. Ill. 2009) 675 F.Supp.2d 912, aff’d, 630 F.3d 563. The
Blockowicz Court based its decision on federal procedural rules, which are
described in more limited terms than California’s rules on third-party
injunctions. (Compare id. at 915 [non-party “must be acting in concert or
legally identified (i.e. acting in the capacity of an agent, employee, officer,
etc.) with the enjoined party”], with Planned Parenthood, 107 Cal.App.4th
at 35 [injunction can run to non-party “with or through whom the enjoined
party may act”]). However, even under the federal rules, the Blockwicz
Court implicitly recognized that it had the authority to enforce its injunction
against the non-party, but apparently declined to do so only as a matter of
discretion. (See id. [“the court finds that it should not exercise its authority
under the facts in this case”]). Needless to say, the fact that the Blockowicz
Court declined to “exercise its authority” under federal procedural rules
says nothing about whether it was proper for the trial court in this case to
do so under California law.
Yelp’s brief largely reaffirms the above settled principles before it
attempts to escape them in a three-point argument. Yelp’s first distinction
– that the above authority only enjoined unnamed parties – defies logic.
(See OBM, 25). If due process permits an injunction to be enforced
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against unnamed individuals, then a fortiori a more specific injunction
would pass muster. That makes sense in this case, where the adjudication
below was limited to three specific statements posted on Yelp. Under
Yelp’s strained view of due process, the removal order would have been
required to cover broadly all “websites” through whom Bird posts
defamatory content – an impossible result – instead of honing in on Yelp
and the specific remarks that were adjudicated. Even after more than 120
years of jurisprudence on this issue, Yelp does not cite any authority for its
backwards proposal that more broadly worded injunctions carry more force
than specifically targeted ones. Injunctions targeting named nonparties,
however, have been upheld. (See, e.g., United States v. Hall (5th Cir.
1972) 472 F.2d 261, 263-264 [upholding injunction that court ordered to
serve “on seven named persons, including Eric Hall. Hall was neither a
party plaintiff nor a party defendant.”]; Paccione, 964 F.2d at 1274-1275
[upholding cease and desist order naming specific nonparty]).
Rather than relying on legal authority for this proposed distinction
between named and unnamed nonparties, Yelp relies on a false premise.
In Yelp’s view, because the injunction specifically identified it as a party
“with or through” whom Bird acts, it “treated Yelp as if it had… [a] full
opportunity to stand up for its rights as a publisher.” (OBM, 25).
However, this argument assumes that Yelp has a First Amendment right as
a publisher of defamation in the first instance, which as described above, it
does not. The argument is also void of any legal analysis to explain to the
Court and Hassell why injunctions involving named nonparties violate due
process, while injunctions that cannot or do not specifically name the bound
nonparty are permissible.
Second, Yelp misrepresents that “the court affirmed the injunction
30

against Yelp without any evidence” as to Yelp’s relationship to Bird. Even
before the injunction was entered, the trial court considered voluminous
evidence and argument concerning Bird’s conduct and her actions through
Yelp. (See e.g., AA.V1.T6.00096, AA.V1.T6-7).12 Yelp cannot credibly
dispute that Bird was acting through its online directory. Bird’s statements
were and still are posted on Yelp’s website with Yelp’s permission and, but
for Yelp’s online space, Bird’s libel would not be published.
Yelp’s third point brings together several of its false legal
presumptions to argue that the Court of Appeal “ignored Yelp’s interests in
its own website.” However, the Court of Appeal did not “ignore[] Yelp’s
interests;” it simply and correctly rejected Yelp’s proposed interest in this
matter. As explained by the Court, “Yelp's claimed interest in maintaining
its Web site as it deems appropriate does not include the right to secondguess a final court judgment that establishes that statements by a third party
are defamatory.” (Op., 11). Yelp also attacks the Court of Appeal for the
way it distinguished cases involving money judgments – an obvious
distinction considering that Hassell is aware of no authority allowing
money judgments to run to a nonparty. (OBM, 28, citing Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d
590; Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 110). This attack hypocritically states that the court did not
explain why that distinction mattered, but then Yelp fails to provide its own
explanation as to why this distinction is unimportant.

12

Yelp also faults the Court of Appeal’s decision for not containing “any
analysis or appreciation of how its [opinion]… will affect websites like
Yelp.” (OBM, 27). As described in Part VI below, these concerns are
overblown.
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V.

THE CDA DOES NOT PREVENT THE COURT FROM
ISSUING A REMOVAL ORDER TO EFFECTUATE ITS
VALID JUDGMENT.
Yelp’s brief twists CDA immunity well beyond its purpose of

shielding internet companies from destructive tort liability. Nothing in the
CDA itself, or in the legislative history enacting it, suggests that Congress
sought to place websites outside the reach of the court system for purposes
of enforcing valid judgments against named tortfeasors. Nor does Yelp
cite any legal precedent to support this strained interpretation of the CDA.
A.

The Plain Language Of The CDA Does Not Prevent A
Court From Enforcing A Valid Judgment.

Hassell have asserted no cause of action and have sought no liability
against Yelp. Nevertheless, Yelp insists that CDA immunity prevents the
court from enforcing its ruling. Not so.
1.

A Court’s Enforcement of A Judgment Against An
Original Speaker Is Consistent With The CDA.

As a threshold matter, it cannot be disputed that the judgment
obtained against Bird is entirely consistent with the CDA. It is uniformly
recognized that “Plaintiffs are free under section 230 to pursue the
originator of a defamatory Internet publication.” (Barrett v. Rosenthal
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 63; see also Green Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Schaeffer
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 13, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142654, at *27 [“a
plaintiff defamed on the internet can sue the original speaker.”], quoting
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456 (2d Cir. 2015) 781 F.3d 25, 28; Zeran
v. Am. Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 [CDA immunity
does not mean “that the original culpable party who posts defamatory
messages would escape accountability”]). Yelp’s brief also recognizes this
uncontroversial proposition. (OBM, 35 [“If someone authors injurious
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content, a plaintiff can pursue the author of that content”]). This lawsuit,
from the filing of the complaint, all the way through the money judgment
and injunction, was structured to do just that – hold Bird accountable for
spreading falsehoods online.
When Bird nevertheless escaped accountability, and refused to
comply with the valid court judgment entered against her, Hassell needed
an enforcement mechanism to ensure the administration of justice. (See
C.C.P. § 128(a)(4) [“Every court shall have the power to… compel
obedience to its judgments, orders, and process”]; see also Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911) 221 U.S. 418, 450 [court’s ability to
enforce orders is “absolutely essential” and prevents the judicial branch
from becoming “a mere mockery.”]). The court’s removal order provided
that enforcement, and directs Yelp, as a party through whom Bird acts, to
put an end to her illegal activity.
“Nothing in [section 230] shall be construed to prevent any State
from enforcing any State law [e.g., a valid state court judgment] that is
consistent with this section.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)). Despite this
express command in the CDA, Yelp seeks to extend its CDA immunity to
protect Bird’s own contemptuous conduct, and ultimately prevent the court
from ensuring enforcement of its valid judgment against her.
2.

Yelp’s Responsibility To Comply With
Enforcement Does Not Arise From Its Duties As A
Publisher Or Speaker.

The plain language of Section 230 immunity, although broad, does
not extend as far as Yelp claims. Yelp’s purported immunity derives from
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the relationship of two subsections, (c)(1) and (e)(3),13 which provide:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking
and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content
provider.
…
(e) Effect on other laws
…
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prevent any State from enforcing any State
law that is consistent with this section. No
cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this
section.
(47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3)).14 This section “as a whole cannot be

13

At times, Yelp attempts to argue that these two subsections create
distinct liability shields. (See OBM, 48). This reading of the CDA is not
supported by the statutory text, which courts read together. After all,
“subsection (c)(1) precludes liability only by means of a definition…
Subsection (e)(3) makes explicit the relevance of this definition.” (Barnes
v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1100). In a footnote, Yelp
tries to support its claim for separate Section 230(c)(1) immunity by
pointing out that federal causes of action have been read into the CDA.
(OBM, 48 n. 21). However, the implied inclusion of federal causes of
action under the CDA, which was not based on statutory text, says nothing
about how this straightforward text should be applied to state law causes of
action. (See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 n. 4 [declining to decide how this
parsing of the statute would be different under a federal claim]).
14
Yelp quotes Section 230(e)(3) as stating, “any state law, including
imposition of tort liability, that is inconsistent with its protections,” (OBM
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understood as granting blanket immunity to [a] provider from any civil
cause of action that [merely] involves content posted on or transmitted over
the Internet by a third party.” (Lansing v. Southwest Airlines Co. (Ill. Ct.
App. 2012) 2012 IL App (1st) 101164, ¶ 40, citing Chi. Lawyers' Comm.
for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2008)). “The correct test, then, is not whether a challenged activity merely
bears some connection to online content.” (Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of
S.F. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155039, at *15).
Instead, parsing those two subsections, the CDA proscribes specific legal
actions under State or local law (either a “cause of action” or the imposition
of “liability”), but only if that legal action is “inconsistent” with subsection
(c)(1) – in other words, only if the legal action itself treats the provider
defendant “as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by”
others.
These requirements for CDA immunity are unmet here. The instant
legal action against Bird neither treats Yelp as the publisher,15 nor sought
to impose any liability on Yelp whatsoever.
First, CDA immunity only applies when a plaintiff’s cause of action
itself is premised on a provider acting as a publisher or speaker of thirdparty content. The test as to whether this treatment exists is “when the

41), but that exact language does not appear in the statute, and the origin of
the quoted text is not clear.
15
Yelp attempts to claim that “[i]n the briefing below, Hassell conceded…
that she is seeking to treat Yelp as the publisher or speaker of information
provided by readers.” (OBM, 43.) However, the citations provided by
Yelp do not include such a concession. On the contrary, Hassell argued
vehemently below that this was not a case like those Yelp cited which tried
to impose liability, rather than simply enforcing a remedy.
(AA.V3.T26.00663-665).
35

duty the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the
defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or speaker.” (Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1107). In other words, the
gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint drives whether the provider is
impermissibly held accountable as a publisher.
CDA immunity is thus consistently denied in cases involving duties
other than a provider’s general duty as a would-be publisher, even if the
legal action is related to third-party content. For example, the Barnes
Court itself entertained a promissory estoppel claim against Yahoo, after it
“promised [and failed] to take down third-party content from its website.”
Even though the Ninth Circuit found that taking down third-party content is
“quintessential publisher conduct,” it refused to apply CDA immunity
because the plaintiff did “not seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or
speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counter-party to a contract,
as a promisor who has breached.” In other words, “[c]ontract liability []
would come not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo's
manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happens
to be removal of material from publication.” (Id. at 1107). As Yelp
concedes, the Barnes Court’s approach to CDA immunity is “instructive.”
(OBM, 47).16
Barnes is far from an outlier, as many other courts have fashioned
similar rationales as to duties that are inherently distinct from general
publishing duties. (See e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016)

16

Barnes also involved a claim for negligent undertaking, which was
subject to CDA immunity under the same test because, for that claim, “the
duty that Barnes claims Yahoo violated derives from Yahoo's conduct as a
publisher.” (Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103).
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824 F.3d 846, 851 [en banc] [failure to warn user of dangers of third-parties
not barred by CDA]; Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, (9th Cir.
2008) 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 [website’s duty not to discriminate as a housing
broker held it responsible for prohibited third-party information]; City of
Chi. v. StubHub!, Inc. (7th Cir. 2010) 624 F.3d 363, 366 [CDA did not
shield website from its duty to collect municipal taxes on transactions
occurring between third party users]; Airbnb, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155039, at *11-12 [no immunity for website against municipal ordinance
prohibiting it from collecting fees from certain postings by third-parties];
Anthony v. Yahoo!, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2006) 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262-63
[CDA does not apply to website’s misrepresentations concerning thirdparty content.]; J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC (2015) 184 Wash.
2d 95, 102-03 [website not immune from tort claim of inducing
prostitution, despite the prostitution conduct coming from third parties];
Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 159 [duties related to software
provider’s own participation in creating content]; Lansing, 2012 IL App
(1st) 101164, [duties of employer to supervise employees’ conduct,
including electronic communications, distinctly different from any duties of
a publisher]).
By contrast, cases that found CDA immunity to be appropriate all
involve causes of action against the provider directly, that fully hinge on
whether the provider breached a duty as publisher or speaker. (See e.g.,
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1120
[dating website not “legally responsible for false content in a dating profile
provided by someone posing as another person.”]; Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir.
2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1023 [defamation claim against website]; Zeran, 129
F.3d 327 [defamation lawsuit against provider after its delayed removal of
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third-party content]; Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc. (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016)
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *6-7 [“the plaintiff's claim [itself must]
seek[] to hold the defendant liable as ‘the publisher or speaker’ of that
information.”]; Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2009) 665 F.Supp.2d 961,
967-69 [nuisance tort against website for third-party content]; Barrett, 40
Cal.4th at 62-63 [plaintiffs could not sue website operator for libel under
theory of notice-based liability]; Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 561, 574 [question is “whether appellants seek to hold
MySpace liable for failing to exercise a publisher's traditional editorial
functions”]; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
790, 806-07 [various tort claims against ISP]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 816, 831 [seeking damages against eBay for its
“dissemination of representations made by the individual defendants, or the
posting of compilations of information generated by those defendants and
other third parties.”]; Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 684, 698 [language of Section 230(e)(3) bars causes of action
asserted directly against internet companies for third-party content]).
The removal order in this case falls squarely in the Barnes line of
authority because Yelp’s duty to comply does not arise from its status as a
publisher or speaker, but as a party through whom the court must enforce
its order. The court’s enforcement of its own orders could take many
shapes. For instance, if Yelp owed money to Bird for some reason, Yelp
could be compelled as a third-party to pay those funds over to Hassell to
satisfy the monetary judgment. (See, e.g., C.C.P. § 708.510). Yelp could
also be required to respond to a third-party subpoena in the course of postjudgment discovery. (See ,e.g., Macaluso v. Super. Ct. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 1042). Here, the removal order simply prohibits Yelp from
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continuing to be the conduit through which Bird violates her injunction – an
uncontroversial way for a court to enforce its orders. As the promissory
estoppel claim in Barnes, Yelp’s duty “here would come not from [its]
publishing conduct, but from” a valid court order that “legally obligated [it]
to do something, which [just] happens to be removal of material from
publication.” (Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107). The Court of Appeal properly
understood this distinction, when it concluded that violations of “[v]iolating
the injunction or the removal order associated with it could potentially
trigger a different type of liability that implicates the contempt power of the
court.” (Op., 30).
Yelp spends considerable energy in its brief cataloging the Zeran
line of cases, including this Court’s Barrett decision, but Yelp does not
explain why that line of authority is controlling, let alone persuasive, in this
context. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with those cases and the
Court of Appeal’s decision in this case. In the current case, Yelp is neither
“cast in the same position as the party who originally posted the offensive
messages,” (Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333,) nor sought to be held accountable for
its own editorial decisions of “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter [such] content,” (Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 43, quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330). Hassell have not sought to “punish[] and deter[]” Yelp in any way
for Bird’s conduct. (See M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media
Holdings, LLC (E.D. Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1055). Instead, as
instructed by both Zeran and Barrett, Hassell have pursued the original
poster of the defamation, resulting in a judgment against her.
Nor is this removal order properly characterized as notice-based
liability, as asserted by Yelp. (See OBM, 40). Nothing in the legal theory
in this case, or in the Court of Appeal’s decision, places Yelp “at risk for
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liability each time it received notice of a potentially defamatory statement
in any Internet message, requiring an investigation of the circumstances, a
legal judgment about the defamatory character of the information, and an
editorial decision on whether to continue the publication.” (Barrett, 40
Cal.4th at 45). Yelp need not investigate or decide anything. On the
contrary, it can host all the content it wants without facing liability for its
own editorial decisions. But if a court must reach out to Yelp for
enforcement, then it must respond to that order just as any party would be
required to do – publisher or not.
The injunctive relief cases cited by Yelp do not suggest any different
result. (See OBM, 50-52). First, Yelp cites only one case that deals
exclusively with injunctive relief, as opposed to cases seeking injunctive
relief side-by-side with money damages. (See id. at 50, citing Medytox,
152 So.3d at 730-731). The injunction sought in Medytox was premised
on a claim for declaratory relief. Yet the court found that the
declaratory/injunctive relief claims could not move forward because,
regardless of whether an injunction was a form of liability, the express
terms of Section 230(e)(3) still barred any “cause of action.” (Medytox,
152 So.3d at 731). Citing Barnes, the court even suggested that its
outcome would be different if the cause of action “does not derive from the
provider's status as a publisher or speaker.” (Id. at 731 n. 1).
The other two cases cited by Yelp involved injunctions that were
part of claims asserted directly against the “provider,” which would
similarly be barred by Section 230’s ban on causes of action. (See OBM,
50-54, citing Kathleen R., 87 Cal.App.4th at 697-698 [injunctive relief as
part of a claim under Section 1983]; Noah v. AOL Time Warner (E.D. Va.
2003) 261 F.Supp.2d 532, 538-539 [injunctive relief as part of a
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discrimination claim arising out of third-party comments in an AOL chat
room]).17 This is not the situation here.
3.

No Liability Is Sought Or Imposed Against Yelp.

Finally, much of the above analysis still assumes that the removal
order in this case was a form of liability against Yelp, which it was not.
As succinctly explained by the Court of Appeal, the removal order issued in
this case does not violate Section 230 “because it does not impose any
liability on Yelp. In this defamation action, Hassell filed their complaint
against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp;
and was awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp.”
(Op., 28). In other words, being the subject of an enforcement order from
the court that seeks to enforce an order against someone else is not
tantamount to being subject to liability. For example, in the context of
postjudgment collection of a money judgment, a garnishee bank is not
liable to a judgment creditor even though it may be compelled to act in aid
of enforcement of that judgment.
Yelp’s argument that the removal order creates a form of liability
barred by the CDA results from its misunderstanding of the Court of
Appeal’s decision. Yelp misrepresents that decision as broadly
“concluding that Section 230 does not apply to requests for injunctive
relief.” (OBM, 49, citing Op., 28). Nowhere did the court suggest such a
broad rule. Instead, the cited part of the opinion correctly distinguishes
Yelp’s authority, and concludes more narrowly that Section 230 does not
“restrict a court from directing an Internet service provider to comply with

17

In a footnote, Yelp also advances a string cite of cases that are all
similarly distinguishable. (See OBM, 51 n. 22).
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a judgment which enjoins the originator of defamatory statements posted on
the service provider’s Web site.” (Op., 28).
Yelp similarly mischaracterizes the court’s “conclu[sion] that Yelp
was acting ‘with or for’ Bird as the publisher of the statements at issue.”
(OBM, at 49, citing Op., 30-31). The court upheld the removal order not
because Yelp was acting as the “publisher of the statements at issue,” but
because Yelp is an entity with a general duty of obedience to the court,
through whom Bird is flouting a court order. (See Op., at 30-31
[“sanctioning Yelp for violating a court order… would not impose liability
on Yelp as a publisher or distributor of third party content.”]). As
described in the above discussion from the Barnes case, this is a significant
distinction.
Remarkably, Yelp argues that it cannot face this contempt power of
the court because Section 230 bars “‘cause[s] of action’ against website
publishers like Yelp.” (OBM, 54, quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1174-75). However, Yelp cites no authority for its proposition that
contempt sanctions constitute a “cause of action.” Given the wide variety
of acts that may constitute “contempt,” many of which do not require a
party to be a named defendant, it appears that California law treats
contempt as a remedy, not a cause of action. (See C.C.P. § 1209(a)).
Further, as the Court of Appeal noted, a “contempt proceeding is not a civil
action.” (Op., 31, quoting Freeman v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d
533, 536).
In short, this case against Bird does not implicate the CDA
immunity. Nothing in the language of the CDA prevents the court from
enforcing its own judgments through a third party, even if that third party
happens to be a website.
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B.

CDA Immunity Was Designed To Protect Internet
Companies From Tort Damages.

“The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” (Roommates.com,521 F.3d at
1164). Instead, as Yelp emphasizes throughout its brief, CDA immunity
was designed as a shield from tort liability. This legislative background
only reinforces Hassell’s reading of the statutory text, which allows them to
enforce their valid judgment against Bird.
Long before the electronic age, traditional defamation law imparted
various forms of liability to “[e]veryone who takes part in the publication,
as in the case of the owner, editor, printer, vendor, or even carrier of a
newspaper is charged with publication.” (Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104). The
standard of liability on these participants largely depended on their role.
“Primary publishers [such as newspapers and magazines] were held to a
strict liability standard, whereas secondary publishers [such as news
vendors and booksellers] were only liable for publishing defamation with
actual or constructive knowledge of its defamatory character.” (Id.).
Thus, the more control exercised over the defamatory remarks, through
editing, the more liability faced by the publisher. (See Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at
44-45 [describing historical distinction].)
These traditional delineations did not mesh well with the
development of the internet. For example, in 1991, CompuServe, a
formerly popular internet service provider, escaped liability in a defamation
case regarding statements made on its online forum. (See Cubby, Inc. v.
Compuserve, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 776 F.Supp. 135, 141). The Cubby
Court reasoned that it would be impractical for CompuServe, like a library,
to be held accountable for all of the content it stored, when it is impossible
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to familiarize itself with such a vast amount of information. The victory
was a narrow one, however, as the court held that CompuServe could still
be held liable if it was on notice of the defamatory character of the
statements. (See id. at 140-41). The Court therefore left open liability on
an internet company as a secondary publisher.
The next major defamation case against an internet company raised
the stakes considerably. It was a $200 million defamation case brought by
an investment brokerage house against Prodigy based on statements posted
by an unidentified third-party in one of its online bulletin boards.
However, Prodigy operated its forums differently than CompuServe.
Attempting to protect its users from potentially offensive content, such as
nudity, Prodigy had a policy of manually reviewing all its users’ messages
prior to posting. The court held that Prodigy’s heavy hand in screening
material for offensive content elevated it to the status of a primary
publisher, leaving it strictly liable for all its content. (See Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) INDEX No.
31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229).
Congressional reaction to the Stratton Oakmont decision was swift.
Later that summer, Congress was already debating whether internet
companies should receive immunity from such suits. As reasoned by Rep.
Cox, the Stratton Oakmont decision “is backward. We want to encourage
people like Prodigy… to do everything possible for us, the customer, to
help us control… what comes in and what our children see.” (141
Congressional Record H8469–H8470 (daily ed., June 14, 1995) [statement
of Rep. Cox]). While removing disincentives for internet companies to
engage in self-censorship of offensive material, the proposed CDA
immunity also had the effect of furthering free speech. Otherwise, “[t]he
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specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an
obvious chilling effect” on speech. (Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331). These goals
have often been described as the “dual purposes” of the CDA immunity
shield. (See Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 51 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see
also OBM, 38).
Devoting considerable space in its brief to this point, Yelp concedes
that “Section 230 grew out of cases… that attempted to adapt common law
tort liability principles to Internet publishers.” (OBM, 36 [emphasis
added], citing Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 44).18 Indeed, court decisions
consistently recognize that the CDA was designed to defeat the potentially
destructive effects of tort damages. (Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 [“The purpose
of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized
the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech…” [emphasis
added]]; Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 57 [“Congress intended to create a blanket
immunity from tort liability for online republication of third party
content.”]). Of course, “Congress could have written the statute [even]
more broadly, but it did not.” (Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853). Courts
have therefore been “careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity
provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage
over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general
applicability.” (Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15).
The legislative background of the CDA demonstrates that this case
does not offend its terms. Unlike Stratton Oakmont, this case does not
18

Yelp even adds special emphasis to this history to drive the point home.
(See OBM, 41 [CDA precludes “any state law, including imposition of tort
liability…”], 45 [Plaintiffs “may only seek recovery from the original
source of the statement”]; 40, quoting Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 46-47, 53
[Congress sought to avoid “the sword point of tort liability”]).
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seek tort liability against Yelp on any legal theory, much less a theory that
it faces publisher liability as one who reviews and edits third-party content.
It does not even attempt to rope Yelp into a “costly and protracted legal
battle[].” (See OBM, 39, quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. (4th Cir. 2009) 591 F.3d 250, 254-255). Nor
could this case have a chilling effect on speech because, outside of these
three postings – which were judicially determined to be defamation-- Yelp
is welcome to maintain its third-party content.
In one final swipe at the removal order, Yelp seeks to knock down
the court’s decision as part of simple “gamesmanship that attempts to
circumvent Section 230.” (OBM, 54, citing Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir.
2016) 836 F.3d 1263). However, the Kimzey case, as all cases cited by
Yelp, involves a plaintiff who attempted to sue Yelp directly, seeking
monetary damages on the “cryptic” theory that Yelp “in effect created and
developed” the reviews at issue. (Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1265-1266). In
other words, it was the plaintiff’s inappropriate attempt to pin the obvious
third-party content on Yelp that doomed its case. Such “gamesmanship” is
clearly not at play here, as Hassell have sought merely to give meaning to
the court judgment they obtained against a named tortfeasor.
VI.

THE PUBLIC GOOD IS NOT SERVED BY PERMITTING
YELP TO PERPETUATE ADJUDICATED LIBEL.
Finally, Yelp presents this Court with a sky-is-falling alert, arguing

that the instant decision will result in a flood of fraudulent lawsuits against
fake defendants. (OBM, 55). Not only are these hypothetical concerns
overblown, but they should not supplant the palpable harm already inflicted
on tort victims such as Hassell.
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First and foremost, although Yelp makes multiple attempts to
disparage Hassell in its brief, its concerns about fraudulent litigation
conduct are not before the Court in this case. Hassell filed a defamation
case lawsuit against a named defendant, providing substantial notice and
opportunity for her to defend herself (as well as actual notice to Yelp).
During a prove-up hearing, the trial court received voluminous evidence,
and determined that Bird had indeed defamed Hassell through her Yelp
postings. The court awarded monetary damages in favor of Hassell in the
amount of $557,918.85, along with injunctive relief against Bird. This
case is indeed far from the fraudulent scheme presented by Yelp; Hassell
did everything correctly. Under Yelp’s own Content Guidelines and
Terms of Service, which forbid “false or defamatory” posts, it even claims
it will – and has – removed such posts. (AA.V.3.T27.00756). This
evidences Yelp’s gamesmanship, not Hassell’s.
Furthermore, there are procedural safeguards that protect the
judiciary from Yelp’s phantom fraud claim. After all, a plaintiff like
Hassell who sues for defamation must still prove defamation and damages
at an evidentiary hearing, even if the defendant has defaulted. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 585). This prove-up requirement prevents people from obtaining
redress against reviews that, in Yelp’s words, are merely “critical,” because
critical opinions without false statements of fact are not defamatory and
would not pass judicial scrutiny. And a plaintiff who fraudulently engages
in this process subjects itself to a number of harsh consequences, including
civil liability under anti-SLAPP laws (as was threatened by Yelp here) or
malicious prosecution torts, criminal liability for perjury, and a host of
other court sanctions. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17 et seq.). With
all of these safeguards, it is difficult to extrapolate very much from the one
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Maryland example cited by Yelp where a reputation management company
apparently filed a fraudulent suit against a defendant, without informing
either the plaintiff or the defendant. (See OBM, 55; RJN, Ex. A-B).
Finally, there are stronger countervailing policy concerns that
support the Court of Appeal’s decision. After all, a person’s right to
petition the court for a redress of grievances is one of the most precious of
rights. (BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB (2002) 536 U.S. 516, 524-25). That
fundamental right is meaningless if the court system is unable to issue
judgments that it can actually enforce. This relief is especially important
in the context of defamation because “[f]alse statements of fact… cause
damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by
counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.” (See, e.g., Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell (1988) 485 U.S. 46, 52).
Even though Yelp touts itself as a champion for constitutional rights,
it takes the absurd position that this Court should limit an individual’s
ability to remedy injurious defamation in order to provide increased
protections for defamatory remarks. What if Bird cannot comply with the
injunction because, for instance, she can no longer log in to Yelp’s website?
What if she is incapacitated, or deceased? Hassell are doomed to remain
victims, and endure unending harm. Yelp’s proposed result is backward.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the opinion of the Court of Appeal should

be affirmed in its entirety.
Dated: January 24, 2017
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
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